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Abstract
We investigate how macroeconomic indicators alter the dynamic risk exposure of different hedge
fund style strategies. We implement a multifactor model to estimate the unobservable time-
varying risk exposure conditional to macroeconomic information and a VAR to measure the
impact of macroeconomic predictors on different time horizons. Using monthly returns on a
cross-section of 10 different style indices from February 1997 to August 2019, we find that, on
average, macroeconomic indicators explain approximately 30%, 55%, and 75% variability of betas
at 1-, 6-, and 36-months horizons, respectively. Although macroeconomic predictors play a critical
role at every horizon, at 1-month the dominating effect comes from idiosyncratic shocks, which
indicates that in the short run hedge fund managers mostly rely on their own reallocation signals.
Moreover, consistent with the fundamental drivers of the smart beta factors, we find that interest
rate level and GDP growth similarly impact hedge fund exposures across styles.
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Highlights:
• This paper study the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and hedge fund dynamic
risk exposure.
• We use Kalman filter to estimate the unobservable beta exposure.
• In the long run: macroeconomic predictors, idiosyncratic and market shocks explain 64.42%,
33.79% and 1.79% of beta’s variability, respectively.
• In the short run: the dominating effect comes from the idiosyncratic shocks.
Keywords: Kalman filter; macroeconomic indicators; factor tilting; conditional betas
JEL classification: G10; G11; G12; G23
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1 Introduction
Do hedge funds shift investment strategies in response to changing market and economic conditions?
The dynamic properties of hedge fund trading have been largely documented in the hedge fund
literature. During the 2007-08 financial crisis, hedge funds managed to unwind part of their exposures
to subprimes, contrary to banks or other institutional investors. In their Global Financial Stability
Report, the International Monetary Fund (2008) indicate that hedge funds suffered only 22.8% of
the total loss related to subprimes in 2006, while banks contributed to 53.3% of the total loss. The
same pattern is found for 2007 (29.2% against 41.3%).
To tackle this question, we test whether hedge funds modulate the dispersion of style returns
regarding economic signals. According to Bass et al. (2017), economic factors set the level of expected
returns, while style factors set the dispersion around these economic factors. Our hypothesis relies
on the recent literature on the economic drivers of smart beta strategies (see, for instance, the
work of Dichtl et al. (2019) and Hodges et al. (2017)). We expect institutional investors and more
sophisticated investors to time their exposure towards these factors by using economic variables.
Our paper contributes to the literature on time-varying beta pricing models for hedge fund
returns. Racicot and Théoret (2016) investigate the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund betas
and alphas and test whether the concentration of trades is related to macroeconomic uncertainty. We
show not only that this concentration of trades occurs in times of high uncertainty but also that, more
generally, hedge funds regulate their exposure to risk factors according to macroeconomic signals.
Moreover, Bali et al. (2014) show that macroeconomic risk is important for modelling hedge fund
returns, and Zheng et al. (2018) find evidence that hedge fund managers alter the market exposure
to changes in market sentiment. We add understanding to this research by providing evidence that
hedge fund managers mostly rely on changes in macroeconomic information and their own private
signals for defining risk exposures. In the short run (1-month), macroeconomics plays a significant
role in explaining around 30% of hedge fund managers’ dynamic trades, but private signals account
for 65%. The situation is almost reverse on a longer time horizon (1 year). Our analysis also shows
that hedge fund managers rely on the same signals across styles. Macroeconomic information is
contained in changes in interest rates, GDP growth, changes in dividend yield and changes in market
uncertainty measured by the VIX impact hedge fund exposures similarly across styles. Indirectly,
our paper answers a question regarding the commonality in hedge fund risk exposures and the threat
to market stability. Our research also has implications regarding the commoditization of hedge fund
products discussed in the media. Our research shows that a large part of their short-term dynamic
trades relies on private signals. However, on an investment horizon of 6 months to 1 year, their
trades are mostly driven by macroeconomic signals.
In our empirical analysis, we revisit the state-dependent approach to modelling hedge fund
1
risk exposures by using a Kalman filter that integrates a broad set of macroeconomic variables.
Mamaysky et al. (2008) already demonstrate the merit of using a Kalman filter over OLS models to
estimate market timing models for mutual funds. OLS models fail to consider the timing dimension
and might overestimate performance. Our approach closely follows Amisano and Savona (2017).
Their approach allows fund betas towards risk factors to directly depend on the change in a broad
set of macroeconomic variables such as volatility, GDP, interest rates and dividend yield. Moreover,
they also use a VAR specification to allow shocks in beta due to idiosyncratic shocks (private signals),
changes in the benchmark, and shocks in market benchmark return due to innovations in predictors.
Accordingly, the extant literature has mostly focused on performance analyses, such as market
timing skills. Our paper also has some implications regarding market timing skills in hedge funds.
We show that market shocks have a limited impact on beta dynamics. However, the aim of this
paper is not to directly analyse the market timing skills of hedge fund managers or to estimate
hedge fund alphas but rather to report the significance of macroeconomic factors (across styles)
when defining their trades. We show that although there are different hedge fund styles, they are
affected by the same macroeconomic predictors and in the same direction and that this explains
30% of their hedge fund managers’ dynamic trades. However, approximately 65% of these trades
are explained by private timing signals, which shows that hedge fund managers create value through
their beta management skills.
Researchers have proposed numerous macroeconomic and financial risk factors to capture hedge
fund risk exposure. We rely on the set of factors defined in Fung and Hsieh (2002), to which we
add a value-growth factor, as in Billio et al. (2012). Our objective is not to identify new risk factors
but rather to consider whether hedge fund managers control the intensity of their exposure based
on economic uncertainty. Our analysis integrates the size, value, and credit spread factors, which
are also factors largely traded in the market. Our results are robust to the inclusion of option-like
factors, which have been extensively examined in the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on hedge fund
dynamic trades. In Section 3, we present a multifactor approach to hedge fund returns and describe
our dynamic approach to hedge fund risk exposures. Section 4 estimates the time-varying exposures
in hedge fund styles. Section 5 relates these dynamic exposures to macroeconomic fundamentals




Business cycles and macroeconomic indicators have been shown to affect investments in small stocks,
value versus growth stocks and the implementation of momentum or contrarian strategies (Griffin
et al., 2003; Gulen et al., 2011; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000). With these investments being
important trades for hedge fund strategies, understanding their determinants is key. The default
and term spread are the usual candidates to proxy for business cycles (see Chen et al. 1986; Fama
and French 1989). Moreover, in Fama and French (1989), the dividend yield is shown to be higher in
periods of depression than in normal market conditions, which explains a strong positive correlation
with the default spread. Moreover, by relying on the Gordon growth model, dividend yield is related
to risk expectation. A high (resp. low) yield indicates that dividends have been discounted at a high
(resp. low) rate Gordon (1959); Patton and Ramadorai (2013). In addition, value-growth and small-
large spreads have been related to economic indicators such as GDP (see Liew and Vassalou, 2000)
and to innovations in interest rates (Brennan et al., 2004; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000).
Interest rates are a proxy for tighter credit constraints, especially for small firms (Perez-Quiros and
Timmermann, 2000), and are adjusted by the Federal Reserve according to market conditions. In
addition, Petkova (2006) relates size and value spreads to innovations in the dividend yield, term
spread, default spread, and 1-month T-bill. Most of these variables appear to be significant when
explaining the economics of the latter risk premia. In particular, dividend yield is positively related
to the returns on small caps but is negatively related to value returns.
The recent literature has placed a special focus on value stocks. Namely, value and growth
stocks display strong business cycles, and the performance of value stocks tends to be depressed
when entering a recession (Petkova and Zhang, 2005). Value stock returns have indeed previously
been shown to be correlated with consumption growth (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001). On the
contrary, Campbell et al. (2018) show that growth stocks protect (‘hedge’) investors against a possible
increase in volatility or the interest rate/discount rate risk. Finally, Zhang (2005) advocates that
growth stocks outperform value stocks on average in down markets due to their cost reversibility
(i.e., capital can be easily downsized). Dichtl et al. (2019) expect incremental risk-adjusted returns
when timing risk factors based on fundamental predictors related to the factor itself (its crowding,
expected return and volatility) and technical predictors such as economic variables. In addition,
Hodges et al. (2017) show that smart beta factors (style and scientific diversification) display a
conditional performance on economic regimes.
The following subsections provide more details on the literature that addresses the time-varying
exposures of hedge funds and the literature on the economic determinants of beta.
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2.1 Dynamic pricing models
Fung and Hsieh (1997) were among the first scholars to identify the impact of dynamic trading
strategies on hedge funds’ return structure. Beyond market factors, their model includes proxies for
the strategy component of hedge fund returns. Similarly, asset-based factors that capture option-
like strategies were added to the analyses conducted by Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and
Hsieh (2004). On the one hand, Fung and Hsieh (2004) consider the payoffs of lookback straddles to
capture the trend-following strategies in hedge funds. On the other hand, Agarwal and Naik (2004)
consider investment strategies that roll over one month to maturity call and put options.
Christoffersen and Langlois (2013) observe a joint dynamic correlation among the equity factors.
If this feature is reconciled with market regimes, hedge fund risk exposures could be made conditional
on different levels of the mean and volatility of the equity market index. In this framework, Billio
et al. (2012) show that hedge fund managers can hedge market exposures. They model volatility
regime changes in the US market index by using a Markov switching model for the 1994-2009 period
and find that conditional exposure to traditional location factors tends to decrease in Standard
& Poor’s (S&P) 500 down states relative to tranquil market states. By also relying on a Markov
regime-switching process, Racicot and Théoret (2019) shows that higher moment risk is conditional
on VIX.
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007), Kuenzi and Shi (2007), and McGuire et al. (2005) use rolling-
window regression-based analyses to estimate fund managers’ current market exposures. Finally,
the theory of structural breaks in hedge fund exposures is grounded in the work of Bollen and
Whaley (2009) and Patton and Ramadorai (2013). The structural change-point regression observes
two market regimes in the fund return data and estimates factor exposures separately in these two
market sub-periods. Criton and Scaillet (2011) further study whether hedge fund exposures display
structural breaks in turmoil periods. Siegmann and Stefanova (2017) find optimal change-points in
the beta-liquidity relationship in periods that feature either market turmoil or structural changes.
Accordingly, structural change-point regression best captures rapid and sharp transitions in fund
exposures, while state-space models best model smooth transitions.
Bollen and Whaley (2009) considers different techniques to model the ease with which hedge
funds shift asset classes, investment strategies and leverage. They compare a simple market timing
model not only to a structural change-point regression with one regime switch in the data but also
to a state-space model in which the factor loadings are assumed to follow a mean-reverting process.
Jawadi and Khanniche (2012), on the other hand, uses a nonlinear multivariate model to study the
dynamic exposure of hedge fund returns to risk factors and find an asymmetrical linkage between
hedge fund and risk factors. Similarly to Bollen and Whaley (2009), we consider a hedge fund’s
exposure to risk factors as an unobservable state variable that follows a first-order autoregressive
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process (AR(1)) and use a Kalman filter to estimate it 1.
2.2 Economic variables and time-varying betas
A large literature exists on the dynamic models for hedge fund returns that incorporate economic
variables. The scope of these studies is mainly on a performance analysis or is limited to the
economic dependence of hedge fund market exposure. Amenc et al. (2003), Brealey and Kaplanis
(2001), and Kat and Miffre (2002) propose conditioning hedge fund market exposures on certain
financial indicators, such as the default spread, the implied volatility or the term spread of the
US market. Cao et al. (2013) demonstrate that a hedge fund’s state-dependent bets are based on
volatility levels. Hedge funds are also shown to reduce risk exposure in times of scarce market
liquidity. Chen et al. (2016) demonstrate hedge fund timing abilities in stocks that are sensitive to
investor sentiment. Finally, Frydenberg et al. (2017) provide evidence of time-varying alphas and
betas for different hedge fund strategies. With a simple moving-average regression framework, they
show that market exposures and the alphas of hedge funds tend to decrease in down markets. Our
research differs from their research as we provide a direct estimate of the risk exposures through
time without determining ex ante the bear and bull periods. Our model is therefore more flexible.
Closer to our work, Racicot and Théoret (2009, 2010) study how a portfolio hedge fund’s alphas
and betas change according to market and economic variables. They use a Kalman filter to infer
the dynamic exposure to risk factors. Racicot and Théoret (2012) investigates how business cycles
affect hedge fund trades and provides evidence of pro-cyclicality in hedge funds’ risk exposure. They
demonstrate that most hedge fund styles are pro-cyclical (e.g., equity L/S and equity market neutral).
An exception is made for distressed securities, which are shown to increase risk exposure during
economic slowdowns. Changes in macroeconomic conditions therefore lead hedge fund managers to
dynamically re-balance their asset allocations. Their study, however, only allows alpha and market
beta to vary according to the state of the economy and accordingly does not relate these estimates
to standard macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, they do not allow time-variability for classical
hedge fund trades in small value caps, which have been shown to be related to macroeconomic
conditions (see supra). More recently, using systematic tail risk measures, Gregoriou et al. (2020)
investigates how downside risk across hedge fund strategies reacts to macroeconomic and financial
shocks.
Furthermore, Kazemi and Islamaj (2018) study the relationship between hedge fund activeness
and performance by using a Kalman filter to estimate the dynamic risk exposure of long/short (L/S)
1In the mutual fund literature, Swinkels and Van Der Sluis (2006) report a return-based style analysis and compare
the following three different approaches to explicitly model the time-varying exposures of mutual funds: a rolling-
window analysis; the Kalman filter; and the Kalman smoother.
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equity hedge funds. In addition, Bali et al. (2014) demonstrate hedge funds’ macro-timing ability.
They show that hedge funds with strong exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty indeed outperform
funds with weaker exposure. Agarwal et al. (2017) also show that uncertainty about volatility is an
important determinant of hedge fund returns.
3 Multifactor model of hedge fund returns
Researchers have proposed numerous macroeconomic and financial risk factors to capture hedge fund
risk exposure. We rely on the set of factors defined in Fung and Hsieh (2004), to which we add a
value-growth factor, as in Billio et al. (2012).
Our objective is not to identify new risk factors but rather to consider whether hedge fund
managers control the intensity of their exposure based on economic uncertainty. Our analysis covers
the period from February 1997 to August 2019. The following definitions of asset-based risk factors
are used in our multifactor model:
1. SP: the S&P 500 monthly return index, which characterizes the US equity market risk factor;2
2. SC-LC: the Small minus Big index is computed as the monthly return difference between the
Russell 2000 minus the Russell 1000 indexes;2
3. VC-GC: the High minus Low index is computed as the monthly return difference between the
Russell 1000 Value minus the Russell 1000 Growth indexes; and2
4. CredSpr: Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield relative to the yield on 10-year Treasury constant
maturity.3
In addition, as control variables, we include the following five option-like factors from Fung and
Hsieh (2004) and their extended FH-9 model 4:
1. PTFSBD: return of a portfolio of straddles on bond futures;
2. PTFSFX: return of a portfolio of straddles on currency futures;
3. PTFSCOM: return of a portfolio of straddles on commodity futures;
4. PTFSIR: return of a portfolio of straddles on interest rate futures; and
2Obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream, Inc.
3Time-series BAA10YM was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
4Available on the authors’ website: http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/ dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls
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5. PTFSSTK: return of a portfolio of straddles on equity futures.
As the use of a rolling window or sub-samples does not allow us to capture smooth changes
and to relate them to changes in macroeconomic conditions, we use a Kalman filter to estimate the
unobservable time-varying risk exposure. Our research departs from the alpha and beta estimates
of Cai et al. (2018) as their research focus is on alpha and its decay. Our objective is to obtain a
direct estimate of time-varying betas. We therefore perform a dynamic return-based style analysis
as follows:
Rt − rf = αt + β1,t · (S&P − rf ) + β2,t · (SC − LC) + β3,t · (V C −GC) + β4,t · CredSpr
+β5 · PTFSBD + β6 · PTFSFX + β7 · PTFSCOM + β8 · PTFSIR
+β9 · PTFSSTK + εt (1)





As stated before, our paper is innovative because it examines the dynamic market exposures
to economic conditions. We consider that managers incorporate macroeconomic information via
risk factor exposure by timing the dynamic risk exposure to different macroeconomic conditions.
In contrast to Amisano and Savona (2017), we consider that beta depends on economic variations.
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, and we consider the following macroeconomic
factors used by Bali et al. (2014):
1. DIV: the aggregate dividend yield on the S&P 500 Index;5
2. RREL: the relative T-bill rate, defined as the difference between the three-month T-bill rate
and its 12-month backward moving average; and6
5Obtained from Robert Shiller’s online data library: http://www.econ.yale.edu/shiller/data.htm.
6Obtained from the Federal Reserve Board: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.
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3. VIX: the implied volatility on the S&P 500.7
4. GDP: the US monthly growth rate of normalized GDP;8
Savona (2014) shows that a performance evaluation can be distorted if the time-varying exposures
of hedge funds are not considered. Hedge funds indeed exhibit time-varying betas related to changes
in volatility, T-bills, term spreads and liquidity. Our analysis adds understanding to this paper by
not examining performance valuations but whether commonalities exist in the way that hedge funds
globally time their exposure to factors. Furthermore, the time-varying dimension is extended beyond
market beta to all factors. Note that as in Agarwal and Naik (2000), because hedge funds exhibit
considerable flexibility in terms of asset allocation (e.g., short selling and cash holding), there is no
restriction on the negative exposure to risk factors, and we relax the constraint that style weights
must sum to one.
3.1 Hedge fund data
Hedge fund returns are downloaded from the EDHEC-Risk Institute webpage for the period from
February 1997 to August 2019. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the main hedge fund
indexes. Biases (backfill, survivorship, selection) in hedge fund data are well known in the literature.
The alternative indexes published by the EDHEC are designed to provide good representation and
benchmarking of the hedge fund universe. Because we do not aim to measure the performance
of hedge funds but rather to understand their investment strategies, we are less concerned by the
intrinsic biases in the reporting procedures.
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
Among equity-focused funds, L/S equity represents the most liquid strategy. The downside risk
(which is represented by negative skewness) is weaker in this strategy than in other strategies. Short
selling exhibits a positive skewness but performs poorly over the sample period. The market-neutral,
merger-arbitrage, fixed-income arbitrage and relative value strategies can be considered to be “short
volatility” strategies. These strategies might strongly suffer in the event of market turmoil and high
volatility, as represented by strong negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis. Event-driven,
convertible arbitrage and distressed securities suffer from a specific downside risk (corporate events),
which explains the deep negative skewness. The global macro strategy is the most diversified hedge
fund strategy, which might explain its positive skewness. In our analysis, we do not consider the
7Obtained from the CBOE: http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/part3.aspx.
8Growth rate is calculated with the time-series USALORSGPNOSTSAM, that is, normalized GDP for the United
States as obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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funds of funds, CTAs or emerging markets. First, CTAs require a specific asset-based approach to
modelling their returns (which we do not follow here). Second, because our objective is to investigate
the impact of US economic indicators on hedge fund-specific trades and hedge fund styles, we exclude
emerging market-oriented strategies and funds-of-funds approaches that aggregate different hedge
fund styles.
Our sample includes periods of high risk aversion and market correction that might be interesting
from a macroeconomic perspective, namely, the Asian financial crisis (1997), the Russian/LTCM
crisis (1998), the pre- and post-dot-com bubble (2000), and the 2007-2009 subprime market crisis
related to high-risk mortgages.
4 Dynamic exposures to asset-based factors
We examine the time-varying risk exposures of 10 hedge fund styles after controlling for their option-
like features. This section reports the descriptive statistics for hedge funds’ exposure to asset-based
factors.
Table 2 describes the hedge fund strategy exposures towards S&P, SC-LC, VC-GC and Credit
Spread, that is, β1,t, β2,t, β3,t, and β4,t, respectively. The table presents the mean, standard deviation,
median, minimum, and maximum of each factor exposure.
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Panel A of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for an L/S equity strategy. This is a widespread
strategy across the hedge fund industry and the largest in terms of assets under management. The
strategy displays the usual average beta on the US equity market (about 0.30). Over the period,
which includes the financial crisis, exposure to equity varied between -0.09 and 0.51, i.e., a 0.60
spread. Larger spreads are observed for L/S equity funds’ exposure to smart beta factors such as
size, value or credit spread. The largest variation is observed for credit spread, followed by the value
factor. Market-neutral strategies are a special case of L/S equity strategies that seek to be neutral
regarding market conditions. A market-neutral strategy presents a very low exposure to equity risk,
as shown by the average exposure to S&P, SC-LC, and VC-GC (less than 0.10 in magnitude). The
exposure to US equity varies by approximately 0.25 over the period, but spreads are wider for the
smart beta factors. More dynamic trades are observed for the credit spread (see Panel B).
Panels C to E of Table 2 cover the hedge fund strategies that focus on corporate events. Within
this group of strategies, the event-driven strategy displays the highest exposure to S&P (around
18%) and to the size factor (around 12%) due to their indirect reliance on economic conditions and
particular types of companies. Within this category fall activist hedge funds. The other corporate-
driven strategies, specifically, merger-arbitrage and distressed securities, show the usual low exposure
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to equity strategies (inferior to 0.10). The risk involved in such strategies is indeed highly specific,
and hedge funds tend to hedge on average their exposure to the market. Distressed securities are
essentially a bet on a specific (micro) risk, as the success of the strategy relies primarily on the
ability of the company to renegotiate its borrowing. Merger-arbitrage strategies mainly rely on an
agreement made between management boards or on political risk, and the exposure to the equity
market is generally hedged. Except for credit spreads, the variation in betas is slightly lower than
for L/S or market neutral strategies, especially for merger arbitrage strategies. (We observe a lower
variation of betas on equity factors over the period: 0.20–0.30.) As expected for a strategy that
involves credit risk, the variation in credit spread exposures is the highest among the three strategies
and among the highest over the 10 strategies investigated in our research.
Panels F and G in Table 2 cover fixed-income and convertible bond arbitrage funds. Fixed-
income arbitrage and convertible arbitrage display very small exposures to most of the asset-based
factors (inferior to 0.035 in magnitude) except for the credit spread factor. They both display an
average negative exposure to the credit spread with a large variation over the period. The exposure
to US equity (resp. value factor) varies widely over the period for fixed-income arbitrage (resp.
convertible arbitrage).
Relative value strategies combine long and short positions to capture the price spread from
mispricing between two securities. Panel H, Table 2 on relative value shows low exposures to the
equity factors (S&P, SC-LC, VC-GC), but these might vary widely over the period. The highest
variation is found in the credit spread and value factors. Global macro is the most diversified strategy
among the hedge fund categories. Global macro funds exhibit directional exposures on the US equity
factor. Their exposures to any risk factors change sharply over time.
For all “long-bias” strategies displayed from Panels A to I in Table 2, we observe an average
negative exposure to the credit spread, which means that all strategies on average hedge credit risk.
Moreover, they present short exposures to the value factor, as shown in Billio et al. (2012), with an
important negative skew over the period. On the contrary, Panel J on the short selling strategies
displays strong negative exposures to L/S funds with negative average exposures to S&P and SC-LC
but positive average exposure to the value factor (with less asymmetry between the positive and
negative sides). The exposure to credit spreads stays strong and negative.
Table 3 displays the exposures and significance of the five control variables for the option-like
features. Most strategies display significant negative exposures to the straddle on interest rate, which
shows that the strategies’ performance is resilient to a small variation in interest rates. Almost all
strategies exhibit positive and significant exposure to straddles on equity, which indicates the ability
of these funds to earn a return from the equity market in up- and down-market conditions.
Market-neutral, fixed-income arbitrage, event-driven and distressed funds display strong non-
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linearity, as shown by the significance of the three option-like factors, including straddles on bonds
– which are negative, like interest rates.
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
5 Time-varying betas and macroeconomic information
This section examines how macroeconomic indicators affect hedge fund dynamics. First, we examine
the economic determinants of each factor trade following our methodology described in Section
3. Second, we implement a VAR specification such as in Amisano and Savona (2017) to further
understand the part of beta dynamics that is related to macroeconomic signals.
5.1 Economic determinants of hedge fund betas
Table 4 displays the regression coefficients of hedge fund style exposures to the macroeconomic
indicators estimated by Equation 3.
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Table 4 shows that factor exposures are highly dependent on macroeconomic information across
all hedge fund styles and across risk factors. The four economic indicators are indeed significant
for defining betas across all strategies. We add understanding to the extant literature by showing
that macroeconomic information is an important determinant for measuring the exposures to all
risk factors, not only for the US equity market factor. In addition, our results are consistent with
the known economic drivers of smart beta factors. This new evidence indicates that hedge fund
managers use fundamental macroeconomic information to design their dynamic strategies.
Figures 1 to 10 illustrate the conditional beta dynamics regarding the macroeconomic factors for
each hedge fund style.
[Figures 1 to 10 AROUND HERE]
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the trades of L/S equity funds are highly directional and are
driven by all four macroeconomic indicators, i.e., interest rates, the dividend yield, implied volatility
and GDP. The exposures to the value factor depend on interest rate changes and dividend yield
variation, which have both been shown to be fundamental drivers of the factor (see Campbell et al.
2018; Petkova and Zhang 2005). Moreover, a context of highly volatile markets combined with
GDP growth encourages taking more growth and size risks. Again, these macroeconomic indicators
have previously been related to small growth risks and to, among other things, the real options
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embedded in small growth stocks (see Campbell et al. 2018; Grullon et al. 2012). Fig. 1 especially
emphasizes the strong relationship between the investment trades in US equity and value factor and
the evolution of interest rates, as well as GDP growth and the size factor (81%).
The results displayed in Panel B of Table 4 for market-neutral funds also strongly support the
hypothesis that macroeconomic information has an impact on hedge fund managers’ trades. All
economic indicators significantly affect the exposures of this specific hedge fund style. First, the
exposure to the equity market proxied by S&P is positively related to changes in the dividend yield
and interest rates such as L/S strategies. Second, exposure to the size factor is positively related
to changes in implied volatility and the dividend yield. Third, exposure to value risk is negatively
related to changes in dividend yield. An increase in the dividend yield has been shown to be a
proxy for risk (see Section 2 and to impact the performance of the factor. These results provide
evidence that hedge fund managers use these fundamental trading signals when making their asset
allocation. Finally, exposures to the credit spread rely mostly on changes in interest rates, which
might negatively affect low-rated stocks. Fig. 2 illustrates the strong relationship between changes
in interest rates and exposure to the market factor, changes in volatility and small cap investing
and, finally, GDP growth and the credit spread factor (with a multiplicative effect).
Panels C and D of Table 4 for event-driven and merger-arbitrage funds show that an increase in
interest rates commands a significant increase in the exposure to the equity market, as proxied by
S&P, and to the value factor. As for the previously discussed strategies, an increase in volatility and
GDP growth positively impacts the exposure to the size risk, especially for event-driven strategies.
Furthermore, a dividend yield increase negatively affects the exposures to the value factor. This
evidence is also perfectly illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4.
Panel E of Table 4 and Fig. 5 for the distressed strategy provide similar information to Panels C
and D. We observe a similar positive relationship between equity market investing and an increase in
interest rates, a positive impact of volatility on both equity and small cap investing, and a negative
impact of an increase in dividend yields on value factor exposure. Finally, directional bets on equity
and other smart beta strategies depend on GDP growth, especially when implied volatility in the
market is high.
Panel F of Table 4 and Fig. 6 on fixed-income arbitrage shows a positive impact of interest rates
on global market exposure and the value factor. Dividend yields also affect the exposure to the size
and value factors.
Table 4, Panel G on convertible arbitrage and Fig. 7 both show a positive relationship between
exposure to the equity market (i.e., S&P, small cap) and an increase in interest rates, which posits
that interest rates are a proxy for good market conditions. As previously shown, GDP growth
commands higher exposure to the value factor, which benefits from economic expansion. Credit
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spread exposure is mostly negative, and the position depends on volatility.
Panel H of Table 4 and Fig. 8 on relative value shows the usual positive relationships recorded
above between US equity and value factors and positive innovations in interest rates, as well as be-
tween GDP growth and the size and value factors. Most surprisingly, an increase in GDP commands
a lower exposure to equity.
Panel I of Table 4 on global macro funds and Fig. 9 jointly show the (positive) dependence on
the interest rates of hedge fund equity and value exposures and indicate the impact of GDP growth
on equity and size factors. Implied volatility is also an important determinant of global macro funds’
size exposure.
Finally, exposures to the risk of short selling are the least dependent strategies on macroeconomic
information as shown in Panel J of Table 4 and Fig. 10.
5.2 Beta decomposition
The aim of this section is to measure how much macroeconomic predictors impact beta dynamics. In
more detail, we want to determine the amount of information that DIV, RREL, VIX, and GDP (as
defined in Section 3) contribute to the hedge fund’s beta dynamics at different time horizons, that
is, 1, 6, and 36 months. For this exercise, we use the betas’ estimates obtained in Section 4 (towards
our four factors) and follow Amisano and Savona (2017), who uses a structural VAR representation
where the macroeconomic variables and the market benchmark (S&P 500) are also represented in
the VAR. Similar to Amisano and Savona (2017), the VAR is constructed based on two assumptions:
i) the unexpected part of beta depends on market shocks, and ii) the unexpected market benchmark
depends on macroeconomic shocks. Following this specification, we can identify the idiosyncratic,
market and macro shocks that affect beta. The VAR specification is given as follows.

1 −Φ aβm




























where zt is a vector of macroeconomic factors (DIV, RREL, VIX, and GDP), and Φ is a vector of the
estimates obtained in state space representation (Eq. 3). To avoid collinearity issues, we eliminated
the interaction effect predictor.
Table 5 presents the forecast-error variance decomposition of betas for each hedge fund index at
1-, 6-, and 36-month horizons. The results are quite conclusive: on average, macroeconomic factors
play a critical role in the variability of betas and explain around 30%. In addition, the impact
of macroeconomic factors increases significantly with the time horizon, and we observe an average
increment of nearly 25% from 1 to 6 months and 10% from 6 to 36 months, which explains almost
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65% over the long run. Market shocks explain a limited percentage of the beta dynamics in the short
run (less than 10%, except for the market neutral fund exposure to small caps and short sellers’
exposure to value factors). The effect of market shocks is further reduced in the long run (less than
2% on average). These results are quite similar to the results of Amisano and Savona (2017) for
mutual funds. Finally, at the 1-month horizon, the dominating effect comes from the idiosyncratic
variability, which indicates that in the short run, hedge fund managers mostly rely on their own
reallocation signals.
Table 6 presents the forecast-error variance decomposition of betas for each hedge fund index at
1-, 6-, and 36-month horizons from January 2010 to August 2019, which excludes the Asian financial
crisis (1997), the Russian/LTCM crisis (1998), the pre- and post-dot-com bubble (2000), and the
2007-2009 subprime market crisis. The results remain quite stable, but we observe an important
increment, from 4.44% to 11.53%, in the market contribution to betas’ variability. However, the main
explanatory variables that explain beta dynamics are private signals, followed by macroeconomic
information in the short run, and macroeconomic information, followed by private signals in the
long run. Market shocks play a marginal role in beta dynamics.
[TABLE 5 and 6 AROUND HERE]
6 Discussion
This paper posits that if economic factors affect stock prices and investment trades in the form of
factor or style investing, they should affect hedge fund investment allocations. In particular, business
cycles and macroeconomic indicators have been shown to affect investments in small stocks, in value
versus growth stocks and in the implementation of momentum or contrarian strategies. We examine
hedge fund exposures towards the smart beta factors such as the value, size and credit spread across
10 hedge fund styles.
Our results identify commonalities in the links between the beta exposures and the macro factors
across strategies. These relationships are consistent with the fundamental drivers of the smart
beta factors established in the literature Brennan et al. (2004); Campbell et al. (2018); Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001); Liew and Vassalou (2000); Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000); Petkova
and Zhang (2005); Zhang (2005). We indeed show that macroeconomic information, especially the
information contained in interest rates and GDP growth, similarly impact hedge fund exposures
across styles. Exposure to the value, size and US equity factors are highly conditional on interest
rates, GDP and volatility, and they i) tilt towards value risk with GDP and interest rates increases
and 2) tilt towards growth/small cap risk during times of increased volatility (higher volatility
increases the value of growth options), which supports the hedging properties of growth stocks
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against volatility (Campbell et al., 2018). We also observe a long bias in the small size risk across
hedge fund styles, as noted by Agarwal and Naik (2004), Billio et al. (2012). This exposure is mostly
influenced by volatility.
Regarding the extant literature, we contribute to Racicot and Théoret (2016), Zheng et al. (2018)
and Bussière et al. (2015) by showing how hedge funds regulate their exposure to all risk factors
according to macroeconomic signals and by providing evidence that hedge fund risk exposures rely
on the same signals across styles. In contrast to the findings of Racicot and Théoret (2012), however,
the exposures to S&P and smart beta premia closely follow interest rate evolution (except for short
selling) across all styles.
The changes in dividend yield are mostly important for equity-based strategies (L/S and market
neutral), corporate-specific strategies and relative value strategies. For equity-based strategies, an
increase in dividend yield induces a decreased exposure to the market factor and value factor. For
corporate-specific strategies, it commands an increased exposure to the size factor but a decreased
exposure to the value factor. We observe the same impact for relative value strategies, including
fixed-income arbitrage. A higher dividend yield proxies for a high discount rate risk, which benefits
growth stocks according to the framework of Campbell et al. (2018).
Our paper does not draw direct conclusions on timing skills and alphas as there is a look-ahead
bias (also shared by other papers) when measuring performance that uses the entire period to
estimate the alpha at a point in time. However, our assumption is that if factor tilting is mainly
based on pure private skills, we should not find common determinants of the changes in hedge fund
risk exposures across styles. Our results show that most hedge funds trade on the same economic
signals but that their private timing skill is the most important driver of their proprietary trades.
7 Conclusion
The extant literature has shown that hedge fund trades are affected by macroeconomic variables.
However, the literature mostly focuses on the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on hedge fund
performance and market exposure and does not make a direct link between macroeconomic data and
larger hedge fund asset allocation. Our paper addresses the time-dependency of a selected number
of smart beta factors that have been shown to be common across strategies. This is particularly
important, as hedge funds tend to package beta management as a form of alpha or abnormal skills.
Most strategies entail dynamic trading in alternative risk premia such as the size, value and credit
spread. This paper does not investigate the full universe of risk premia but uses commonly accepted
risk premia in the hedge fund industry to perform an experiment on the impact of macro-information
on factor exposure. Volatility, GDP growth, innovations in interest rates and dividend yields are
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significantly related to factor tilts. Moreover, the fundamentals that drive this dynamic allocation
can be related to previous work, including Campbell et al. (2018), Petkova (2006), Petkova and
Zhang (2005), and Grullon et al. (2012) on the value and size factors. Our results therefore suggest
that hedge funds perform very similar asset allocations based on public signals and use fundamental
drivers of the factors to design their trades. These results are common across hedge fund managers.
This suggests that hedge fund managers provide similar methods of beta management.
Finally, the conditional risk allocation across hedge fund styles described in this paper might in
fact reveal trend-following and reversal patterns in the underlying risk factor. If hedge fund trades
reflect trends in the underlying factors, this would affect the market timing skills of those managers.
This topic is part of our future research agenda.
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Asset-based risk factor exposure statistics
Panel A: Long/short equity Panel B: Market Neutral
Mean Median Std Max Min Mean Median Std Max Min
αt -0.2138 0.3659 1.8037 2.1025 -5.0846 0.3340 0.2568 0.7472 2.8051 -1.4074
β1,t 0.2856 0.2801 0.1031 0.5107 -0.0911 0.0516 0.0527 0.0526 0.1474 -0.1283
β2,t 0.1450 0.1436 0.0978 0.4779 -0.1732 0.0497 0.0283 0.0854 0.5463 -0.0674
β3,t -0.0999 -0.0891 0.1803 0.2922 -0.7003 -0.0653 -0.0705 0.0948 0.1119 -0.3763
β4,t 0.1519 0.0397 0.6072 1.7636 -0.8601 0.0065 0.0586 0.2695 0.4851 -0.8109
Panel C: Event Driven Panel D: Merger Arbitrage
Mean Median Std Max Min Mean Median Std Max Min
αt 0.6480 0.8584 1.5871 3.9652 -4.3333 0.1144 0.1831 0.7715 1.5162 -1.8399
β1,t 0.1775 0.1832 0.0929 0.3617 -0.1423 0.0773 0.0616 0.0476 0.1849 -0.0279
β2,t 0.1212 0.1189 0.0818 0.4371 -0.0969 0.0698 0.0759 0.0459 0.2146 -0.0595
β3,t -0.0117 0.0025 0.1095 0.1716 -0.4565 -0.0016 0.0142 0.0676 0.1074 -0.1733
β4,t -0.1380 -0.2155 0.6415 1.7873 -1.3823 0.0652 -0.0009 0.2480 0.7443 -0.4123
Panel E: Distressed Securities Panel F: Fixed-Income Arbitrage
Mean Median Std Max Min Mean Median Std Max Min
αt 1.9048 2.2393 1.7793 5.5602 -3.5177 1.0600 1.0265 1.3005 4.3545 -2.1783
β1,t 0.0994 0.1055 0.0922 0.2719 -0.2078 0.0034 0.0124 0.0931 0.2532 -0.4539
β2,t 0.0685 0.0607 0.0726 0.3819 -0.1229 -0.0065 -0.0044 0.0421 0.1214 -0.1357
β3,t 0.0166 0.0342 0.1017 0.2400 -0.4310 -0.0235 -0.0042 0.0904 0.1617 -0.3550
β4,t -0.6437 -0.8722 0.8472 1.9418 -1.8882 -0.3221 -0.3378 0.6012 1.3792 -1.8041
Panel G: Convertible Arbitrage Panel H: Relative Value
Mean Median Std Max Min Mean Median Std Max Min
αt 2.4958 2.3620 1.0105 5.1880 0.5706 0.2843 0.6158 1.7045 3.6215 -4.2585
β1,t 0.0322 0.0447 0.0729 0.1866 -0.2193 0.0958 0.0971 0.0601 0.2101 -0.1353
β2,t 0.0100 0.0094 0.0461 0.1568 -0.0997 0.0446 0.0429 0.0645 0.2321 -0.1442
β3,t -0.0030 0.0092 0.1161 0.1724 -0.5958 -0.0027 0.0060 0.0870 0.1356 -0.2984
β4,t -0.8471 -0.7325 0.6694 0.9640 -2.6237 -0.0043 -0.1429 0.6751 1.9231 -1.2819
23
Panel I: Global Macro Panel J: Short Selling
Mean Median Std Max Min Mean Median Std Max Min
αt 0.5486 0.5511 1.0912 3.5162 -2.5857 2.6405 2.6207 2.7751 9.5553 -3.5785
β1,t 0.1828 0.1662 0.1296 0.4663 -0.2959 -0.5610 -0.5343 0.3922 0.5326 -1.8897
β2,t 0.0010 -0.0052 0.1099 0.4447 -0.2402 -0.4304 -0.4560 0.1743 0.0910 -0.7944
β3,t -0.0182 -0.0210 0.1824 0.3970 -0.4776 0.2372 0.2315 0.1911 0.5691 -0.6504
β4,t -0.1349 -0.1548 0.3801 0.9751 -1.0936 -1.0620 -1.0993 0.9099 1.2409 -3.1165
Table 2: This table presents the statistics for each filtered time series of asset-based risk factor
exposures (the time-varying risk exposures estimated through a Kalman filter). Each panel reports




Panel A: Long/short equity Panel B: Market Neutral Panel C: Event Driven
β5 -0.0008 (0.4228) -0.0024 (0.1528) -0.0096 (0.0112)
β6 -0.0004 (0.4555) 0.0061 (0.0007) 0.0004 (0.4481)
β7 -0.0051 (0.1083) -0.0028 (0.1128) -0.0032 (0.2110)
β8 -0.0120 (0.0001) -0.0025 (0.0501) -0.0114 (0.0001)
β9 0.0115 (0.0052) 0.0053 (0.0165) 0.0068 (0.0616)
Panel D: Merger Arbitrage Panel E: Distressed Securities Panel F: Fixed-Income Arbitrage
β5 -0.0028 (0.1833) -0.0097 (0.0113) -0.0077 (0.0110)
β6 0.0020 (0.2032) 0.0017 (0.3027) -0.0020 (0.2262)
β7 -0.0027 (0.1788) -0.0062 (0.0604) 0.0008 (0.3917)
β8 -0.0067 (0.0002) -0.0095 (0.0001) -0.0051 (0.0034)
β9 -0.0025 (0.2206) 0.0077 (0.0422) 0.0073 (0.0188)
Panel G: Convertible Arbitrage Panel H: Relative Value Panel I: Global Macro
β5 -0.0012 (0.3641) -0.0025 (0.1903) 0.0119 (0.0089)
β6 -0.0020 (0.2469) -0.0017 (0.2173) 0.0137 (0.0004)
β7 -0.0047 (0.0804) -0.0031 (0.1254) 0.0043 (0.1871)
β8 -0.0092 (0.0001) -0.0083 (0.0001) -0.0104 (0.0004)
β9 0.0133 (0.0004) 0.0025 (0.1939) 0.0101 (0.0279)






Table 3: This table presents estimates for the option-like risk factors used as control variables (the
p-values are presented in parentheses). Each panel reports a different hedge fund strategy.
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